Sobre cómo Milton Friedman desaconsejaba la adopción del euro en 1997
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31/07/2012#1 Sobre cómo Milton Friedman desaconsejaba la adopción del euro en 1997OMFG, encontré este artículo de Milton Friedman desaconsejando la adopción del Euro... en 1997! Después personas como la presidenta mandan en una bolsa de gatos a todos los economistas, diciendo que no saben nada, o que aconsejan cosas que fracasan. Bueno, acá está la prueba de que no siempre es así y que esas acusaciones son injustas en una buena cantidad de casos.
The Euro: Monetary Unity To Political Disunity?
SAN FRANCISCO - A common currency is an excellent monetary arrangement under some circumstances, a poor monetary arrangement under others. Whether it is good or bad depends primarily on the adjustment mechanisms that are available to absorb the economic shocks and dislocations that impinge on the various entities that are considering a common currency. Flexible exchange rates are a powerful adjustment mechanism for shocks that affect the entities differently. It is worth dispensing with this mechanism to gain the advantage of lower transaction costs and external discipline only if there are adequate alternative adjustment mechanisms.Illustration by Chris Van EsThe United States is an example of a situation that is favorable to a common currency. Though composed of fifty states, its residents overwhelmingly speak the same language, listen to the same television programs, see the same movies, can and do move freely from one part of the country to another; goods and capital move freely from state to state; wages and prices are moderately flexible; and the national government raises in taxes and spends roughly twice as much as state and local governments. Fiscal policies differ from state to state, but the differences are minor compared to the common national policy.
Unexpected shocks may well affect one part of the United States more than others -- as, for example, the Middle East embargo on oil did in the 1970s, creating an increased demand for labor and boom conditions in some states, such as Texas, and unemployment and depressed conditions in others, such as the oil-importing states of the industrial Midwest. The different short-run effects were soon mediated by movements of people and goods, by offsetting financial flows from the national to the state and local governments, and by adjustments in prices and wages.
By contrast, Europe’s common market exemplifies a situation that is unfavorable to a common currency. It is composed of separate nations, whose residents speak different languages, have different customs, and have far greater loyalty and attachment to their own country than to the common market or to the idea of "Europe." Despite being a free trade area, goods move less freely than in the United States, and so does capital.
The European Commission based in Brussels, indeed, spends a small fraction of the total spent by governments in the member countries. They, not the European Union’s bureaucracies, are the important political entities. Moreover, regulation of industrial and employment practices is more extensive than in the United States, and differs far more from country to country than from American state to American state. As a result, wages and prices in Europe are more rigid, and labor less mobile. In those circumstances, flexible exchange rates provide an extremely useful adjustment mechanism.
If one country is affected by negative shocks that call for, say, lower wages relative to other countries, that can be achieved by a change in one price, the exchange rate, rather than by requiring changes in thousands on thousands of separate wage rates, or the emigration of labor. The hardships imposed on France by its "franc fort" policy illustrate the cost of a politically inspired determination not to use the exchange rate to adjust to the impact of German unification. Britain’s economic growth after it abandoned the European Exchange Rate Mechanism a few years ago to refloat the pound illustrates the effectiveness of the exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism.
Proponents of the "Euro" often cite the gold standard era from 1879 to 1914 as demonstrating the benefits of a common currency. But the gold standard also had its costs. The period was characterized by declining prices from 1879 to 1896, rising prices thereafter, and sharp fluctuations within each period, especially severe in the 1890s. The standard was viable only because governments were small (spending in the neighborhood of 10 percent of the national income rather than 50 or more percent as now), prices and wages were highly flexible, and the public was willing to tolerate, or had no way to moderate, wide swings in output and employment. Take away the rose-colored glasses and it was hardly a period or a system to emulate.
As of today, a subgroup of the European Union -- perhaps Germany, the Benelux countries, and Austria -- come closer to satisfying the conditions favorable to a common currency than does the EU as a whole. And they currently have the equivalent of a common currency. Austria and the Benelux three have, to all intents and purposes, linked their currencies to the Deutschmark. However, these countries still retain their central banks and hence can break the link at will. Any country that wishes to link to the Dmark more firmly can do so on its own, simply by replacing its central bank with a currency board, as some countries (such as Estonia) outside the EU have done.
The drive for the Euro has been motivated by politics not economics. The aim has been to link Germany and France so closely as to make a future European war impossible, and to set the stage for a federal United States of Europe. I believe that adoption of the Euro would have the opposite effect. It would exacerbate political tensions by converting divergent shocks that could have been readily accommodated by exchange rate changes into divisive political issues. Political unity can pave the way for monetary unity. Monetary unity imposed under unfavorable conditions will prove a barrier to the achievement of political unity.
http://www.project-syndicate.org/com...tical-disunity
Más allá de su ideología, con la cual no coincido en varios aspectos, sin duda necesitamos más genios así.
pd: perdón por el artículo en inglés, cuando tenga un tiempo lo traduzco. -
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Baneado/a - Baneado
31/07/2012#2 Re: Sobre cómo Milton Friedman desaconsejaba la adopción del euro en 1997
Friedman, los Chicago boys y la Escuela de Economía de Chicago!! El papi del querido neoliberalismo, segun dicen los que saben!!
Buenos pibes!!
Daban becas a unos cuantos estudiantes de economía sudacas para ir a USA a "inyectarles" el amor por el neoliberalismo en las clases de Don Friedman (Et al!!) , para que al retornar a sus países propaguen tan hermosas enseñanzas (infecciosas!) y cuando se den las condiciones propicias (dictaduras genocidas , etc) colocarlos en puestos de poder (ministros de economía, de finanzas, etc)...
¡¡¡¡Genio Friedman!!!!
Después leo el articulo, Albert , pero como mencionaste al autor , aproveché y comenté.
gracias -
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31/07/2012#3 Re: Sobre cómo Milton Friedman desaconsejaba la adopción del euro en 1997
EL DE LA IZQUIERDA ES FRIEDMAN, EL DE LA DERECHA, POR SI NO LO UBICAN ES PINOCHET, UNO DE LOS PRIMEROS EJECUTORES DEL EXPERIMENTO NEOLIBERAL; PARECE QUE LOS GENIOS SE VAN TODOS POR EL MISMO CAÑO. -
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31/07/2012#6 Re: Sobre cómo Milton Friedman desaconsejaba la adopción del euro en 1997muy linda la sección ad hominem con los caballitos de batalla de siempre como "neoliberalismo", "dictadura" y demás lugares comunes, más el archivo de fotos incluido (a la 678), todo auspiciado por Naomi Klein. Ahora, si discutimos sobre la nota? O, en todo caso, a su actuación como economista?
A ver, veamos qué resultados tuvo el "experimento neoliberal" en Chile:
En 1980, Chile tenía el séptimo mayor ingreso per cápita de Latinoamérica. Actualmente, estamos en el segundo lugar. En 1987, cuando se hizo por primera vez la encuesta Casen, el 47% de los chilenos era pobre, cifra que se redujo hasta la tercera parte. Aun la desigualdad de ingresos que, medida por el índice de Gini, había alcanzado un máximo de 0,61 en 1985, comenzó a bajar lentamente hasta situarse en 0,53 en 2006. (...) la indigencia llegó a su más bajo nivel histórico al alcanzar un 2,8%. Lo mismo ha ocurrido con la distribución del ingreso, ya que los chilenos más pobres han visto aumentar sus ingresos en 24% desde 2009, más que el resto del país.
(...)
Mientras muchas naciones sufren, los últimos datos disponibles muestran aquí un crecimiento de 5,3% entre mayo de 2011 y el mismo mes de 2012, un desempleo de 6,7% y una inflación de -0,3% en junio. Además, un reciente informe de la OCDE indica que somos uno de los tres países de los 34 que integran la organización cuyos índices de empleo han aumentado desde la crisis de 2008, y aquel donde lo han hecho en mayor medida.
http://www.gob.cl/blog/2012/07/24/el...o-funciona.htm
Crecimiento mayo a mayo 2012 en Chile del 5,3%, desocupación del 6,7% e inflación del -0,3%. Ah, con un aumento interanual del 3,3% de la producción industrial. No digo que el modelo chileno sea invencible, ningún modelo lo es. Pero taaan mal no le fue a Chile con el "experimento neoliberal", que obviamente fue infinitamente mejor acompañado con democracia. -
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31/07/2012#8 Re: Sobre cómo Milton Friedman desaconsejaba la adopción del euro en 1997vamos a practicarlo forísticamente ahora, denunciado. Si querés hacerte un thread sobre la represión de la dictadura chilena, con gusto participo.
Ahora opinemos sobre el tema del thread (aunque parece que acá no se puede, obviamente me equivoqué al hacer esto). -
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31/07/2012#9 Re: Sobre cómo Milton Friedman desaconsejaba la adopción del euro en 1997yo estaba opinando desde el aspecto económico, bertelotti, por eso puse el artículo sobre el euro. Podés opinar de euro, economistas, políticas económicas, todo dentro de la temática. No sobre política.
---------- Mensaje agregado a las 13:32 ---------- Mensaje anterior a las 13:31 ----------
flamewaaar, ya! -

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